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T would like to make a few remarks about my current
thinking concerning supervisory issues related to bank
exposure to LDCs, including supervisory attitudes
toward new instruments such as those which will be
part of the Mexican financing package. Before turning
to those supervisory issues, allow me to make several
more general observations on the LDC debt situation.
As a matter of perspective, several points are worth
stressing even if in summary fashion. They are:
First, despite all the problems, the frustrations and the
setbacks, I believe that more progress has been and is
being made than is often recognised. Certainly, when
we look at individual countries - a process which has
always been at the heart of the case-by-case
philosophy - there are a number of instances in which
progress has been dramatic.
Second, now as in the past and in the future, sound
macro and structural economic policies in the debtor
countries are the necessary pre-conditions for lasting
success. But, as in many things, necessary conditions
are not always sufficient. To bridge the gap between
the necessary and the sufficient, we must keep firmly in
mind that cooperative efforts between the debtor
countries, the commercial banks, the IFIs and the
creditor countries remain essential. It is still a package
deal such that if any of these groups fails to fulfill its
responsibilities, all will suffer including the one that by
its short-sightedness triggered the unravelling in the
first instance.
Third, obviously debt reduction and debt service
reduction have an important and necessary role to
play in the process. Flowever, debt reduction or debt
service reduction, no matter how well conceived and
executed, are not a full substitute for the extensions of
fresh credits to the debtor countries by both official
institutions and commercial banks. This is the very
essence of the approach laid out by Secretary Brady in
his speech in March of this year.
Stated differently, absent access to private sources of
finance over time, the longer run capacity of the
debtor countries to finance growth and development
would be in further jeopardy, especially since it seems
to me self evident that governments in the industrial
world are not willing or able to take on that task in
isolation. Thus, what we need is a balanced approach
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to financing in which fresh credits, public and private
- operating in tandem with elements of debt and debt
service reduction - remain an important part of the
process.
In this regard, I would note that the proposed Mexican
and Philippine financing packages both contain
options providing for fresh credits. In each case
modest amounts of new money from the international
commercial banking community will be vitally
important to the ultimate success of these financing
packages.
Fourth, having emphasised the importance of fresh
credits, let me also stress the very considerable benefits
of debt or debt service reduction. In the case of
Mexico, for example, the permanent cash flow benefits
growing out of the contemplated debt and debt service
reduction transactions are truly significant. But, as
important as the cash flow gains may be, there are
other important benefits to Mexico. For example, the
principal amount of a very sizable fraction of Mexico's
external debt will be fully secured at maturity and it is
likely that tens of billions of dollars of such debt will
have an interest rate of 6.25 per cent locked in for 30
years - not an inconsequential element of protection
against the vagaries of the interest rate cycle over time.
Needless to say, to the extent Mexico benefits from
these arrangements, it follows that creditors, both
current and prospective, should also benefit. That,
too, is the essence of the Brady initiative.
Let me now turn to my current thinking about
supervisory attitudes toward LDC debt in general and
to the specific supervisory treatment in the US of
Mexican-type transactions and instruments. Let me
stress that these views are a reflection of my own
thinking, but they are not necessarily the last words on
this subject. My comments fall into four major points:
First, the overall thrust of policy with respect to
reserves against country exposures is unchanged.
Banking organisations are expected to have adequate
capital reserves to cover the risks associated with all
forms of lending, including country exposures. In
exercising this responsibility to assess the adequacy of
an Organisation's reserves, account will be taken of a
bank's overall financial condition, focusing parti-
cularly on its asset quality, capital, and management,
against the background of current and prospective
financial and economic conditions. These assessments
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of reserve adequacy will continue to be made on a
case-by-case basis.
We want very much to emphasise this case-by-case
philosophy in a manner that avoids the perception
that there is a single reserve or provision ratio that is
'right' for all institutions at all times.
Second, sovereign risk related provisions or reserves
can be viewed in the following framework:
The measure of exposure will be the amount of credit
outstanding to all countries that are 'criticised' or
'classified' by the Federal bank supervisory agencies in
accordance with the appropriate provisions ofUS law
and regulation. However, when measuring overall
commercial bank exposure to such countries, it would
not be unreasonable to deduct the amount of
performing trade credits outstanding to all such
countries. In other words, performing trade credits
can be viewed as outside the framework of any special
reserving or provisioning requirements. It should be
noted also that there are a few countries that, by virtue
of their economic and financial performance, have
been upgraded from the list of criticised or classified.
As such, existing and new credits to such countries can
be seen as outside the need for any special
requirements so long as their improved status is
maintained.
The measure of reserves or provisions against
exposure will include the amount of funds taken out of
current earnings or charged against retained earnings
for this purpose. In addition, the assessment of reserve
adequacy can, within acceptable bounds, take account
of prospective tax benefits available to individual
banks as a result of loan loss provisions taken against
such exposures.
For US banks, taxes paid are generally. not reduced
when provisions or reserves are established. However,
as actual charge-offs occur, taxes may be reduced,
providing the opportunity to replenish the reserve
without additional charges against net income. Thus,
the after-tax level of reserves can be significantly
greater than the stated level of reserves. The purpose
of the tax adjustment to the reserve coverage ratio is to
take account of this consideration and in the process
make reserve ratios for US banks more comparable
with international practices. For example, based on
developments prior to the current quarter, this tax
adjustment factor raises the average effective reserve
coverage ratio of US money centre banks by almost
5 percentage points.
The measure of reserve coverage may also take
account of the present value of any collateral or
interest guarantees growing out of Mexican-type
swaps of loans for new debt instruments carrying such
collateral or guarantees. For reserve adequacy
purposes, it is quite reasonable to treat this amount as
an addition to reserve coverage so long as the new
bonds are being serviced in an orderly fashion and the
guarantees are intact. This too will have the effect of
raising effective reserve coverage beyond that
suggested by a simple ratio of exposure to reserves.
Third, taking account of these definitions and
concepts, and in circumstances in which reserves for
individual banks are judged to be at acceptable levels,
additional reserves need not be automatically
established in connection with fresh credits extended
to the debtor countries in connection with inter-
nationally supported financing programmes. Any
such judgement will, of course, be subject to
continuing review, a process which will become all the
more straightforward in a setting in which economic
policy and performance in the debtor countries is
strengthened.
Finally, with regard to debt or debt service reduction
transactions such as will be part of the Mexican
financing package, the following additional comments
will apply.
When a bank participates in debt reduction
transactions, a lower level of reserves can be quite
acceptable so long as the new debt instrument is
booked at par and appropriately enhanced
(collateralised at maturity with interest support) and is
being serviced in a timely manner. In particular, where
such transactions are essentially an exit instrument
and reserves are otherwise at acceptable levels, the
present value of the collateral and interest guarantees
may suffice as adequate reserve coverage depending
on the overall circumstances unique to individual
banks.
In instances involving debt service reduction trans-
actions, the new bonds may, for supervisory purposes,
be booked in the investment account at par so long as
the sum of reserves (as defined above and taking
account of the present value of collateral and interest
guarantees) and the 'fair value' of such bonds equals
or exceeds their par value. In the alternative, banks
may follow the guidance recently provided by the
Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the
accounting treatment of such instruments.
While other treatment of these transactions may be
appropriate, banks should consult with the appropriate
Federal bank supervisor regarding the supervisory
and prudential merits of any alternate approach in
advance of utilising such approaches.
This approach is intended to balance a number of
considerations in a context of providing the maximum
degree of flexibility to individual banking institutions.
It starts with the premise that prudential standards
must be just that - prudent. However, it also
recognises that reserves or provisions are not charge-
offs or write-downs. Indeed, what we are all striving
for is a result in which the great bulk of these reserves
will not be needed and as conditions improve banks
59
will be able to recoup elements of such reserves into
future income or devote them to other prudential
purposes. Aside from these prudential considerations,
the approach is designed to (I) recognise countries
whose performance has resulted in their 'promotion'
out of the classified or criticised categories;
recognise the special nature of trade credits;
provide very flexible treatment for debt or debt
service reduction transactions of the Mexican type;
and (4) provide the necessary flexibility within which
banks can, consistent with their own business and
credit judgements, choose new money options without
having to provide further reserves so long as their
overall reserve position is adequate.
There is one final point to be emphasised in regard to
reserving or provisioning practices. Namely that
reserves or provisions provide an important cushion
against possible losses in the principal amount of bank
exposure to debtors. They are, in other words, a
cushion in balance sheet terms. However, reserves (or
for that matter write-downs) do not reduce the bank's
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claim against the debtor. For this reason and others,
debtors should not conclude that the mere existence of
such reserves constitutes a license to ignore their
fundamental obligations to their creditors. By the
same token, major creditors should remain mindful
that even a generous level of reserve coverage does not
mean that they can walk away from the process.
Neither the balance sheet nor the income statement -
to say nothing of the risks to the well-being of the
global economy including its implications for both the
balance sheet and the income statement - would be
well served by such neglect.
The months immediately ahead will not be easy. There
are 10 or more developing countries in some stage of
discussion, negotiation or syndication of new
financing packages with official and private creditors.
However difficult it may be, it should be very clear that
now is not the time to cut and run. With flexibility,
with commitment, and with a renewed sense of that
commonality of purpose of which I spoke earlier, I
believe we can and must see it through.
